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Javier Domínguez Lacasa 
 
COMPETING FOR PARTNERS: STRATEGIC GAMES 
IN WHOLESALE INTERNATIONAL ROAMING 
 
Abstract  
High international roaming prices have puzzled and occupied analysts and regulators for quite 
a time. While on the retail side the problem seems to be well understood, and the high 
margins can be justified using Ramsey pricing logic, on the wholesale side the picture is not 
so clear. 
 
Recent contributions find reasons for regulation at the wholesale level based on the existence 
of random traffic and on the bilateral nature of the wholesale deals, which raise the 
equilibrium prices even when operators can choose a preferred network. This paper intends to 
investigate whether or not those concerns are justified. This is done by modelling the bilateral 
roaming negotiations and extending the current models, assuming that home operators (the 
ones with a retail contract with the customer in its country of residence) can decide not only 
their preferred network in each visited country, but also the distribution of their outbound 
traffic among the visited operators. There are technological solutions that allow this steering, 
and the results change dramatically. 
 
When traffic steering is perfect no operator has market power, and lower prices are passed on 
to end users through competition for retail customers. Contrary to previous findings, the 
bilateral nature of international roaming wholesale deals is actually an additional source of 
competition, because the roaming out traffic (the traffic of an operator’s retail customers 
abroad) and the roaming in traffic (the traffic of foreign customers that an operator is able to 
attract) are directly linked, and this creates an incentive for operators to lower the prices of 
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High international roaming prices have puzzled and occupied analysts and 
regulators for quite a time. While on the retail side the problem seems to be well 
understood, and the high margins can be justified using Ramsey pricing logic, on 
the wholesale side the picture is not so clear. 
 
Recent contributions find reasons for regulation at the wholesale level based on 
the existence of random traffic and on the bilateral nature of the wholesale 
deals, which raise the equilibrium prices even when operators can choose a 
preferred network. This paper intends to investigate whether or not those 
concerns are justified. This is done by modelling the bilateral roaming 
negotiations and extending the current models, assuming that home operators 
(the ones with a retail contract with the customer in its country of residence) can 
decide not only their preferred network in each visited country, but also the 
distribution of their outbound traffic among the visited operators. There are 
technological solutions that allow this steering, and the results change 
dramatically. 
 
When traffic steering is perfect no operator has market power, and lower prices 
are passed on to end users through competition for retail customers. Contrary to 
previous findings, the bilateral nature of international roaming wholesale deals is 
actually an additional source of competition, because the roaming out traffic (the 
traffic of an operator’s retail customers abroad) and the roaming in traffic (the 
traffic of foreign customers that an operator is able to attract) are directly linked, 
and this creates an incentive for operators to lower the prices of retail roaming 
compared with a scenario of anonymous wholesale trading. 
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wholesale roaming team. I’d like to mention especially the lessons learned from Tandria Enrique, 
Gary Hope, José Antonio López-Jamar and Ángel Merodio. Comments from Germán González and 
Fernando Herrera from the Telefónica Spain regulatory team were also very useful. Any 
misinterpretations or mistakes in the modelling are not their fault. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
International roaming gives mobile customers the possibility to use their mobile 
handset and their mobile phone number when they travel to a foreign country, in 
which their home network operator has no coverage. Operators in the country of 
residence of the customer (“home operators”) conclude agreements with 
operators in the foreign country (“visited operators”). Through these agreements, 
visited operators let foreign users connect to their networks, and charge a 
wholesale fee to the home operators, who in turn charge end users a retail price 
for the service. In general, international roaming agreements are bilateral, in the 
sense that each party is both a seller (it acts as a visited operator and receives 
“inbound” traffic from the other party) and a buyer (it acts as a home operator 
and sends “outbound” traffic to the foreign operator).  
 
Whether international wholesale roaming should be regulated is not a 
straightforward question: there are several suppliers per country and traffic 
steering techniques, which get more efficient by the day, allow home operators 
to direct traffic to preferred networks in the visited country. It is not obvious that 
there is a bottleneck that calls for regulators to intervene. Nevertheless, 
International roaming is regulated in the European Union since 2007. On the 
wholesale side, visited operators have to comply with a cap on the average 
revenue per minute, per SMS and per Megabyte. The cap has to be complied on a 
yearly basis for each home operator (i.e. visited operators cannot charge some 
home operators above the cap and others below the cap). 
 
There is a small but growing literature on international roaming. Recent papers 
have generally argued in favour of the need for regulation, focusing on two 
possible market failures. One comes from what we can call “random traffic”, the 
portion of traffic that cannot be controlled at all by the home operator and is 
distributed randomly among the visited operators. Salsas & Koboldt (2004), Lupi 
& Manenti (2006, 2008) and Foros, Wasenden & Ambjørnsen (2011) assume that 
there is always a portion of traffic that is random, and as a consequence in their 
models there is always at least some traffic that is independent from the 
wholesale price. Visited operators are monopolists with respect to this traffic,   
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and this creates an incentive to charge supracompetitive prices which are highest 
when traffic steering techniques are poor and when the number of competitors 
in the visited country is large (because in that case each individual wholesale 
price has a smaller effect on the average wholesale price perceived by the home 
operator). 
 
A second, more subtle, market failure arises from the bilateral nature of the 
market (a single agreement involves operators acting as both sellers and buyers). 
Shortall (2010) points out that operators with a large market share in outbound 
traffic (the communications made by their customers abroad) have an advantage 
which they can use to charge a premium to the operators who want to partner 
with them, even when traffic steering is completely reliable and a single 
preferred network can be selected. It should be noted that his model has 
restrictive implicit assumptions, in particular that excess capacity exists in all 
networks, that the price of wholesale roaming cannot go below a certain level 
and that traffic steering technologies are imperfect and force each home 
operator to choose just one network in the visited country as a preferred partner. 
Using a different perspective, Bühler (2009) finds that alliances can be used as a 
commitment device to soften competition in the retail market. The logic is that 
an alliance can be used as a way to make credible a long term commitment to 
exchange traffic at a high price with a particular operator in the visited country, 
signalling the competitors in the home country that a price war is unlikely. 
Bilateral agreements facilitate this strategy because the potential loss of retail 
revenues caused by high retail prices is compensated by the traffic commitments 
and high prices agreed within the alliance. Interestingly, both Bühler (2009) and 
Shortall (2010) propose banning bilateral trading as an alternative to the price 
controls currently in place. 
 
The European Commission has shown sympathy for these views, and in fact it 
opened to consultation the idea of effectively banning bilateral trading as a 
“structural solution” to the problem of high roaming tariffs. For practical reasons 
it seems unlikely that such a solution will be implemented, but nevertheless the 
argument of lack of competition in the wholesale market remains uncontested   
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The main purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the results of the 
previous literature still hold when we relax some of their assumptions. In 
particular it will be assumed, more realistically, that visiting operators can choose 
more than one preferred network, and decide the distribution of traffic among 
the networks in the visited country. As will be shown, this new assumption 
changes the outcome dramatically, and it no longer holds that the wholesale 
price is inefficiently high. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: sections 2 serves as a 
prologue, with a brief discussion of the “random traffic” market failure. Sections 
3 and 4 contain the core of the analysis, first with a model in which there is no 
random traffic, but the home operator can only steer its outbound traffic (the 
communications of its customers abroad) to a single visited network, and then 
extending the analysis to the case of perfect steering. Section 5 discusses the link 
between the wholesale and retail international roaming markets. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2.  On the relevance of random traffic 
The standard line on the history of roaming is that random traffic is a source of 
trouble, because it gives visited operators monopoly power and leads to high 
wholesale prices that are ultimately paid by travellers using their phone abroad.  
 
The logic
2 is as follows: each operator in the home country has roaming 
agreements with all networks in the visited country, but only one of them is 
selected as the preferred network. This network receives a certain percentage of 
the traffic, while the rest is “uncontrolled”. If all networks had the same 
coverage, random traffic would be shared evenly. With n visited operators, each 
                                                 
1 BEREC (2011) states that “… wholesale price regulation continues to be appropriate. There is no 
strong reason to believe that wholesale competition will be more intensive in the future than it 
has been in the past. On the other hand, costs of provision should reduce rather steeply, for 
example as a result of anticipated reductions in regulated mobile termination rates” 
2 See Lupi & Manenti (2008)   
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would receive 1/n of the random traffic. All the networks not selected as 
preferred networks are actually monopolists on their share of random traffic, and 
the only constrain for them is the impact of their decision on the retail price and 
indirectly on end user demand. The conclusion is that the expected wholesale 
price is above the competitive level. In fact, just like we see in mobile termination 
models, the higher the number of suppliers the higher the market price, because 
when the number of suppliers is large, each wholesale supplier taken individually 
thinks that their price has a low impact on the retail price. 
 
No doubt, there are countless stories about the tricks used by visited operators to 
be the first to connect a foreign customer and keep it on a particular network. 
However, the devilish nature of random traffic should not be overestimated, for 
several reasons. 
 
First of all, as long as there are several networks available in the visited country 
home operators have strong incentives to invest in traffic direction technologies, 
and there are several suppliers of solutions that make it affordable even to the 
smallest operators. Under these circumstances, it is doubtful that there is a 
market failure that requires regulation. It might just be that traffic routing is 
simply another cost element that enters into the production function like any 
other. 
 
Secondly, we must not forget that random traffic can only take place when the 
home operator decides to permit their customers to connect to several networks. 
If an operator feels it is being overcharged in its random traffic, and cannot 
afford traffic steering, there is always the alternative of barring connections to all 
networks but one. The end users would have access to the same quality that the 
residents of the visited country get, and the home operator would be able to 
choose among competing networks. Barring can also be used as a temporary 
measure to put pressure on visited operators and force them to lower the price, 
with the effect that after some time the measure is lifted, the perceived 
wholesale price is reduced and the roamers can continue enjoying the benefits of 
multi-network coverage. 
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Finally, random traffic is many times just lack of coverage from the preferred 
operators. Good coverage is expensive, and the operators who have invested on it 
are entitled to use it as a competitive tool, and charge a premium for it. Again, it 
is not clear that regulators should step in and set a price cap, and if they do they 
should consider that the “problem” exists only in high cost areas. 
 
3.  Traffic steering to a single network 
Up to 2009 random traffic was considered by regulators and analysts as the only 
source of inefficiency in the international roaming wholesale roaming, and the 
justification for regulation. An influential paper by Tony Shortall then hinted that 
there could be something else. In short, he showed that the wholesale price is not 
the only competing tool in the hands of visited network operators: those with a 
large retail roaming customer base have an advantage because they can use it to 
exchange traffic and attract the biggest visiting operators to their network.  
 
This section extends the model of Shortall (2009), looking more in depth at the 
“wholesale game”, but keeping the three main assumptions, namely: 
•  That each home operator can only partner with a single network in the 
visited country. 
•  That capacity constraints are not an issue in roaming negotiations, and 
therefore there are no incremental costs associated to international 
roaming. 
•  That there is a “competitive floor” to wholesale prices, a minimum below 
which operators are not interested in selling roaming services. This floor 
can be interpreted as the average network cost, or as the price of 
wholesale national roaming (pricing wholesale international roaming 
below this level would allow foreign operators to compete for customers 
in the home market for mobile services). The main point is that by pricing 
at this “competitive floor” a profit per minute above marginal cost is 
made by the visited operator. 
 
The first assumption will be relaxed in the next section, while it is fairly straight 
forward to show that when there is not a “competitive floor” above the marginal 
cost competition would drive prices down to that marginal cost even if just one   
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network can be selected as a preferred partner
3. Note in any case that the 
“competitive floor” coupled with excess capacity might be a realistic assumption 
to depict roaming negotiations, where agents have bounded rationality. Volumes 
of international roaming are generally very small compared with overall traffic, 
roaming contracts cover a fairly short timeframe (usually one year), and 
estimates of marginal costs are hard to make and subject to great uncertainty. 
 
To begin, a simple numeric example is useful to grasp the main insights of this 
scenario. 
 
Let’s suppose that there are two countries and two operators in each country. 
Following Shortall (2009) we will suppose that each operator has a fixed amount 
of traffic to “send” to the other country, and that this amount is not affected by 
the wholesale price. This might seem at first sight like a quite strong assumption, 




Country “B” sends 50% more traffic to country “A” than it receives, and in both 
countries there is a leader with a 70% market share and an entrant with a 30% 
share. Leaders are denoted in capital letters, and entrants in small letters. The 
fixed amounts of outbound traffic are: 
 
Operator A  70 
 
Operator B  105 
Operator a  30 
 
Operator b  45 
Total outbound traffic 
from country "A"  100 
 
Total outbound traffic 
from country "B"  150 
 
Let’s normalize the competitive floor to 1, and assume that it is the same for all 
four operators. Recall that this means that none of them finds it worthwhile to 
offer international wholesale roaming below that price level.  
 
                                                 
3 See for instance Lupi & Manenti (2009). 
4 We discuss the impact of the wholesale game on the retail market in a later section of the paper, 
but for the moment note that introducing elasticity in the retail demand would reduce the 
equilibrium wholesale prices as visited operators try to increase wholesale revenues.   
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We first want to find out if, at the competitive floor, there is a combination of 
bilateral relationships that dominates the rest, in the sense that a pair of 
operators, one from each country, can’t find a better alternative than to buy from 
each other. 
 
The following graph shows the wholesale profit (outbound costs minus inbound 
revenues) for the different operators under the two possible combinations of 
bilateral agreements. Under scenario 2 the leaders commit their traffic to the 
entrants in the foreign country, and use their negotiating power to force them to 
accept the competitive floor (p=1). Under scenario 1 the leaders and the entrants 
partner with their respective peer in the foreign country, and agree on a price 



























It is clear from the graph that for the leaders the best alternative is to exchange 
their traffic: if “B” pays “A” anything between 35 and 75 monetary units they 
both end up better off than under scenario 1, and for “A” it is a feasible 
agreement because the price agreed “α” is at least equal to one. We cannot 
anticipate what the wholesale price between the leaders would be, but we can   
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define a range: the result of the game is that “A” and “B” mutually agree to 




Regarding the entrants, once the customers of the leaders are out of their reach 
their options are to commit their traffic to each other or to buy from the leaders 
at the competitive price. The outcome of the two alternatives is represented in 




























Scenario 1 is feasible (p≥1) and better for both entrants if “b” makes a payment 
to “a” which lies anywhere between 15 and 45. Again, the net seller has more to 
lose than the net buyer if an agreement is not reached and we could expect the 
price agreed to be closer to the lower end of the range. 
 
                                                 
5 Note however that “A” has more to lose if an agreement is not reached, and therefore we could 
expect the price to be closer to 1 than to 2.14.   
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We are now in a position to develop the game algebraically and draw some 
general conclusions: 
 
Assume there are two countries, “A” and “B”. The operators with more outbound 
traffic in each country (the “leaders”) are denoted with capital letters, and the 








The game begins with the leaders agreeing on a price.  Staring with “B”, there are 
two alternatives open: choosing the entrant or the leader in the other country. 
These are the outcomes in each of the two alternatives: 
 
 
) ( ) ( B a a B T T P a − ⋅ = Π  
 
Where  i P  is the price agreed by operator “B” with operator i, and  Ti is the 
outbound traffic of operator i. 
 
If we normalize to 1 the lowest price at which the operators would provide 
wholesale roaming services (the “competitive floor”), we obtain that “B” would 
choose “A” as long as  ) ( ) ( B a B A A T T T T P − > − ⋅ , which gives us the highest price 




This price is higher than pa=1,   because TB>TA>Ta, and we can therefore conclude 
that if “B” acts as a price taker, he would be paying a price above the competitive 
floor.  
















a A B T T T > >




If “B” does not act as a price taker, but instead recognizes that the bilateral 
agreement is also the best alternative for “A”, and negotiates the price accordingly, 
its negotiating power would increase, and would be determined by the best 
alternative open to “A”, namely to sign an agreement with “b”. Exactly how good this 
alternative is for “A” depends on its negotiating power with “b”, which in turn 
depends on how much “b” would lose if it signed with “a” as an alternative to “A”. 
Intuitively, the bargaining power of each leader when setting the conditions of their 
bilateral deal depends on the attractiveness of the entrant in its home country as an 
alternative partner. The following graph tries to make this clearer: 
 

















The negotiation between leaders 
 
The x-axis contains the wholesale net payments (outbound costs minus inbound 
revenues) made by operator “B” to operator “A”. First note that at most “B” would 
accept to pay a total of (TB-Ta), which is the payment he would have to make if it 
partnered with “a” at the competitive price. To determine the minimum price that   
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“A” would offer to “B”, we need to look at his alternative, that is, at the wholesale 
profit it would make partnering with “b”. At the competitive price, the profit of “A” 
would in this case be (Tb -TA), but as the graphic shows, “A” is in a good bargaining 
position vs. “b” because “a” (the alternative for “b” as a partner) has less outbound 
traffic to offer. At the competitive price, “b” would pay “a” a net payment of (Tb-Ta), 
which is also the most that “b” would accept to pay to “A”, and as consequence the 
least that “A” would offer to “B”
6.  
 
Some interesting insights can be extracted from the graph: 
•  When outbound traffic from country “A” is divided evenly between operators 
“a” and “A” (Ta and TA are equal), operator “B” can reach an agreement at the 
competitive price, irrespective of its share in the outbound traffic of country 
“B”. 
•  When “A” has a large market share in outbound traffic, and operators “b” and 
“B” share the outbound traffic of country “B” evenly, “A” can extract from any 
of them the maximum they are willing to pay, and charge above the 
competitive price. However, this maximum is lower than it would be if 
outbound traffic market shares in country “B” were more asymmetric. 
•  As outbound market shares in both countries become more asymmetric, the 
range between the minimum and maximum prices that could be agreed 
between the two leaders grows, but it is not possible to say beforehand what 
the agreed price would be. 
 
Regarding the entrants, let’s assume that “b” is the net outbound operator. Since 




) ( ) ( b a a b T T P a − ⋅ = Π  
                                                 
6 More rigorously, the least that “A” would offer is the maximum between (TB-TA) and (Tb-Ta), 
because “A” would never sell below PA=1 




Let’s also set PA=1 as the lowest price that “A” is willing to offer. Following the same 








= ) max( ,  
which is above the competitive price. The bargaining power of “b” comes from the 
fact that for “a” the agreement between entrants is also the best alternative. 
Without an agreement, “a” would have to pay to “B” a quantity equal to Ta at the 
competitive price. Taking into account that “a” would never sell below the 
competitive price, the two entrants would agree to exchange their traffic for a net 
















The negotiation between entrants 
 
 
Summarizing the main results, this section has shown that when traffic steering 
is limited to a single network, the leaders and the entrants in the two countries 
would naturally match with each other. It has also shown that being tied to just   
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one partner is problematic for the net outbound operators, who usually (but not 
always) would pay a price above the competitive floor. The root of the problem 
lies in the fact that the unbalanced traffic has to be routed to a network that is 
not (or at least not only) selected based on the price, but on the amount of traffic 
that can be exchanged. This takes us to the next section, where it will be taken 
into account that operators can select more than one preferred partner and 
decide how much traffic is sent to each of them. 
 
4.  Perfect traffic steering 
 
Up to now the analysis has developed along the lines of Shortall (2010), reaching 
similar conclusions, namely that even when the traffic is steered to a preferred 
network there is something inherent in the wholesale dynamics of international 
roaming that drives the wholesale price up and calls for regulatory intervention 
of some short. However, it would be wrong to conclude that this is always the 
case, because we assumed that all the traffic is steered to a single network, and 
that was the key that gave net inbound operators the power to leverage on their 
outbound traffic and charge a premium. In reality, nothing prevents operators 
from committing traffic with several partners, and those paying a premium have 
a big incentive to work on that direction and develop better traffic steering 
techniques. Unsurprisingly, operators usually sign preferred network agreements 
and volume discounts with more than one operator per country, which suggests 
that the technology already permits the control of the supplier mix
7. 
 
With perfect traffic steering and identical network coverage, it is evident that any 
unbalanced traffic will be charged at the competitive floor, because if it were not 
the buyer would just route it to another network. Outbound traffic still serves as 
a magnet to attract foreign customers, but it does not affect the price of 
                                                 
7 Starhome, a provider of steering solutions, claims that its product can “… monitor and detect the 
smallest deviation of roamers’ usage levels, profile them, and automatically initiate adjustments 
of the Steering of Roaming settings to where network targets have not been met, for voice, SMS 
and data.” In addition, it also provides operators “with an immediate snapshot of the usage status 
and distribution of roamers across all networks in each visited country. The automated solution 
provides efficient steering results by focusing on usage distribution rather than the number of 
roamers” (Emphasis added). http://www.starhome.com/steering-of-roaming.html   
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unbalanced traffic, and its attraction power is lower. To see the impact of traffic 
steering on inbound traffic market shares and total profits, we can use the 
numeric example of the previous section. 
 
Country “A” receives a total of 150 units of traffic, which can be steered to 
operator “A” (70 units of outbound traffic) and operator “B” (30 units). Each 
operator can, through traffic commitment agreements, at least equal the 
inbound traffic and the outbound traffic
8, and the remaining 50 units would be 
shared between them in an undefined way. 
 
Country “B” receives 100 units of traffic, and operator “B” could get at most all of 
it, and at least 55, if operator “b” manages to balance its traffic completely and 
therefore gets 45 units of inbound traffic, which is the maximum it can aim for. 
 
The results in monetary units are shown in the following chart. For simplicity, it is 
assumed that all traffic, and not only the unbalanced portion, is charged at the 
wholesale competitive price. This does not change the net outcome. The results 
from the previous section are also included.  
Operator 
Perfect Steering  Single network 
steering profit  inbound 
revenues 
outbound 
costs  Profit 
A  min 70, max 120  70  min 0, max 50  min 35, max 75   
a  min 30, max 80  30  min 0, max 50  min 15, max 45   
B  min 55, max 100  105  min (-50), max (-5)   min (-75), max (-35) 
b  min 0, max 45  45  min (-45), max (0)  min (-45), max (-15) 
  
In terms of inbound traffic market shares, the differences between the two 
scenarios are the following: 
 
Operator  Single network steering  Perfect steering 
A  70%  min 45%, max 80% 
a  30%  min 20%, max 55% 
B  70%  min 55%, max 100% 
b  30%  min 0%, max 45% 
                                                 
8 Note that with short term excess capacity operators in country “B” would always prefer to pay 
the wholesale price of outbound traffic in kind (i.e. carry a unit of inbound traffic) rather than 




The main point to take away from the charts is that outbound traffic market 
shares still have an impact on inbound market shares, but the link is severely 
weakened because now there is an additional competitive tool that was not 
present under single network steering. Since it is assumed, as discussed in section 
3, that the competitive floor is higher than the short term marginal cost, there is 
a powerful incentive for operators to compete for inbound traffic through means 
different than price. The quality of the wholesale service itself becomes a critical 
factor, and more relevance is now given to issues like whether or not intelligent 
services are available, or whether or not the wholesale invoicing platforms are 
flexible and make it possible to differentiate prices based on end user identities. 
For operator A in our example, for instance, quality of service can mean raising 
their inbound market share from 45% to 80%. 
 
It is important to highlight the differences and similarities between the scenario 
just described and a hypothetical organised exchange where by definition buyers 
and sellers are anonymous and mutual roaming agreements are not possible, 
because that is the normative proposal made in Shortall (2010) and Bühler 
(2009). The most important similarity is that in both cases the price would be the 
competitive floor. One difference is that under perfect steering outbound market 
shares have an effect on inbound market shares, whereas under anonymous 
trading outbound and inbound shares are independent. A second and more 
important difference is that the incentives for innovation on wholesale services 
are very different. To ensure liquidity, the owners of the exchange would have to 
standardise the wholesale service, and any innovation would have to come from 
them, or agreed by the users of the exchange through a painful coordination 
process. Besides, there would be no competitive gains from innovation, because 
everyone would have access to it at the same time. On the contrary, under 
perfect steering innovation takes place more naturally because it is the 
consequence of a competitive process. 
It could be argued that steering solutions are expensive and not worth investing 
in for small operators, and even for big operators when their customers are 
travelling to remote destinations. However, this does not imply that there is a 
market failure that calls for regulators to step in. The incentives of operators are   
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in the right place: they would save money by dedicating resources to traffic 
steering. If anything, a case could be made for regulators to facilitate access to 
traffic steering, or to ban visited operators from using “counter steering” 
techniques
9. Other measures, like wholesale price controls oriented to cost, 
would be a step in the wrong direction and would set the incentives for operators 
in the wrong place: it would no longer make sense to invest in traffic steering, 
and the need for regulation would be a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
 
5.  Consequences for the retail market 
Retail roaming is one small piece in the set of services provided to retail 
customers. Mobile Operators with large sunk and common costs compete for end 
users, for which on average roaming represents currently below 5% of their 
expenditure. Although Ramsey pricing is an analytical tool to model regulated 
monopolies, its basic insight is also applicable to an oligopoly situation where 
competitors try to find the combination of prices that maximizes customer 
satisfaction for a given level of revenue per user. Under this premise, and 
recalling that Ramsey pricing states that for each service prices are equal to the 
marginal cost plus a premium that is inversely proportional to the impact of a 
price reduction on total revenues, we can derive some consequences from the 
results obtained in the previous sections: 
 
The first thing to note is that, in a bilateral relationship, the marginal cost of one 
unit of outbound traffic is equal to the price of unbalanced traffic
10. From the 
previous section we know that, under perfect steering, competition will drive the 
price of unbalanced traffic down to the level of the competitive floor. Therefore, 
the benefits of wholesale competition are completely passed on to the retail 
market.  
 
Secondly, we have seen that outbound traffic has an impact on inbound traffic 
market shares, which creates additional incentives for increasing the outbound 
                                                 
9 Note in any case that operators already have “good practice” rules agreed on GSMA that go in 
this direction. 
10 For an operator “B” partnering with an operator “A” and a price p for unbalanced traffic we 
have that ( ) B A B A B T p T p T T p ⋅ − ⋅ = − ⋅ = Π , and( ) p TB B − = ∂ Π ∂ / .    
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traffic, beyond what would be implied by the price elasticity of the retail roaming 
service itself. In the Ramsey pricing context, the conclusion is that the bilateral 
nature of roaming helps bring the retail price down because the mark up is lower 
than it would other ways be. 
 
In sum, a competitive wholesale market has built-in incentives for retail 
competition on roaming services. The competitive relative retail price of roaming 
in the “mobile basket” is then set based on how much value end users give to 
roaming. Regulators could decide, for instance to foster the idea of a Europe 
without frontiers, that it would be good to put a cap to the retail roaming price, 
but it is hard to accept that this policy is based on a market failure in the retail 
market. 
 
6.  Discussion 
The main point raised by this paper is that, as long as operators are capable of 
steering traffic reliably to more than one network in the visited market, and 
control the amount of traffic sent to each network, the wholesale market is 
competitive and there are no solid grounds for regulation. When traffic steering 
techniques are imperfect, the operators making positive net payments have a big 
incentive to make them better, and the fact that mobile operators in Europe sign 
bilateral contracts with prices for unbalanced traffic well below the regulated 
caps suggests that these techniques are already available.  
 
If wholesale price controls are continued, as seems likely at least in the short 
term, regulators should adopt a cautious approach, because if the regulated price 
for wholesale international roaming is set too low, it can be used by foreign 
operators to enter the domestic markets, which in practice would amount to 
using the Regulation of roaming to set a price for the wholesale national roaming 
across the EU. This contrasts with the fact that there are no price controls 
obligations for that market anywhere in Europe, and it is not even one of the 
relevant markets that National Regulators have to analyse because the European 
Commission itself has considered it structurally competitive. 
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